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Introduction 
Throughout 1981 political life in Northern Ireland has been dominated by 
events at the Maze prison. To date ten Republican prisoners [members of the 
Provisional Irish Republican Army and Irish National Liberation Army 
(INLA)] have died on hunger strike and five more have been given medical 
treatment and nourishment after relatives intervened at crucial stages in their 
fast. 
Outside the prison the two communities have further polarised as evidenced 
by recent polling. The May local government elections witnessed a further 
decimation of the already thinly-populated middle ground as the "political 
status" debate raged on. The trend was best illustrated in the highly charged 
atmosphere of the two by-elections to the Westminster parliament in 
Fermanagh and South Tyrone, a constituency legendary for its rigidly religious 
voting patterns and where in a ritualised game it is assumed that many 
individuals will try to vote more than once. 
In May, in a straight contest between R. Sands, the Anti-H-Block candidate, 
and H. West, Official Unionist, Sands won by a majority of 1,446 votes. After 
Sands had died, the August by-election involved six candidates, but the only two 
who mattered were O. Carron, Prisoners Candidate, and K. Magennis, Official 
Unionist. Again, it was the nationalist who won, this time by 2,230 votes. 
The election of Bobby Sands was a considerable boost to the IRA. The 
reasons for his victory were complex and varied. They included the determina-
tion of nationalist voters not to lose a seat where on a head count basis they con-
stituted a majority; hard line unionist disenchantment with a candidate who was 
seen as one of yesterday's men; the decision by the Social Democratic and 
Labour Party not to contest the election and thus avoid splitting the 
anti-Unionist vote in an area where they had since their formation failed to 
become the voice of the nationalist population; and finally the belief that 
somehow the election of Sands would be an open sesame resolving the impasse 
at the Maze and save his life. This argument rested on the fundamental premise 
(although scarcely believed now) that the British government would be forced by 
domestic and international opinion into granting the five demands of the prison-
ers which in toto.1 amounted to a call for the restoration of special category status 
for prisoners whose crimes were deemed to be politically motivated. This is a 
privilege still enjoyed by some 300 prisoners both Republican and Loyalist 
under legislation introduced by then Home Secretary William Whitelaw in 1972 
and terminated by his Labour counterpart Merlyn Rees in 1976. 
The second by-election resulted from Sands' death. The government intro-
duced legislation barring any prisoner from standing for election but the anti-H 
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Block grouping successfully circumvented this by nominating Owen Carron as 
a proxy prisoners candidate. His manifesto was the five demands of the pris-
oners. (1) The right to wear their own clothing rather than prison issued 
uniform. (2) Freedom of association which includes a measure of autonomy 
within each prison wing and a desire for segregation from other prisoners with 
conflicting political ideologies. (3) The right to do alternative work in the prison 
and to opt out of what they see as traditional demeaning work. (4) The restora-
tion of lost remission for prisoners who had refused to recognise the prison rules 
by going on the "blanket" and "no wash" protests. (5) Flexibility in relation to 
visits, parcels, recreation. Carron was duly elected but in line with Republican 
strategy did not take his seat at Westminster as this would lend credibility to the 
claim that it is the sovereign parliament with jurisdiction over Northern Ireland. 
For the IRA the hunger strike has been the major card they have played 
during the present troubles. What they clearly did not expect was the absolute 
determination of the British government to engage in a battle of wills where no 
concessions would be made irrespective of whether prisoners died or not. This 
problem is clearly illustrated by the decision of the INLA that no more of its 
members would be joining the protest since if the current attrition rate continued 
they would all be dead within six months. Also of note is the increased role 
played by the relatives of the prisoners as the protest more and more appeared 
as a "conveyor belt" of death with confusion reigning over who was really 
controlling the machine. The world's press have long since departed, the period 
of feverish shuttle diplomacy has ended and the objectives of the protest seem 
farther away than ever. 
The stalemate was reached because both the prisoners and government 
realised that underneath the rhetoric lay the kernel of the issue — the challenge 
to the right of the British to legislate in the province. Bobby Sands summed it up 
well: 
"The issue at stake is not humanitarian nor about better or improved 
living conditions — it is purely political and only a political solution will 
solve it." 
The reply of the government, even after all the events of the last nine months is 
the same as when the first hunger strike was reaching a crescendo in December 
1980: 
"Political status is what the protesters and hunger strikers are demanding. 
This the government cannot and will not give." 
What then of the Protestant population? During the present crisis they have 
looked on suspicious of any "behind closed door" deals and with cold detach-
ment as the hunger strikers died. The elections of Sands and Carron were 
viewed as destroying once and for all the myth of a moderate majority within the 
Roman Catholic population. A constant theme has been that the 30,000 + 
voters were laughing over the graves of the large number of Protestants who 
have been murdered in the area, ostensibly because of their membership of the 
security forces. 
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Politically the Democratic Unionist Party under the charismatic leadership of 
the Reverend Ian Paisley has forged ahead on the simple philosophy of no 
surrender to the enemies of Ulster. On the same day as Sands' funeral they 
organised a memorial service in Belfast for the victims of IRA violence under 
the banner "the murderers have a choice the victims had none". Paisley success-
fully raised the spectre of British duplicity during his "Carson Trail" rallies, 
aimed at sinking the Anglo-Irish rapprochement initiated by Premiers Haughey 
and Thatcher at the Dublin summit. Shudders have been set through the entire 
unionist family by the prospect of a Labour government under the leadership of 
Tony Benn and committed to the eventual unification of Ireland being returned 
to power. On a more sinister note the series of nocturnal manoeuvres on hilltops 
throughout the province with Paisley's supporters waving firearms certificates 
showed the often overlooked military arm of aggressive Protestantism. 
Particularly trenchant was his statement of 2 July in the border village of 
Sixmilecross announcing the formation of a new Protestant defence force to 
counter what was perceived as the genocide being waged on their co-religionists 
in the peripheral areas of Northern Ireland: 
"We have a choice to make. Shall we allow ourselves to be murdered by 
the IRA or shall we go out and kill the killers?" 
A second noticeable feature within the Protestant campaign has been the 
establishment of a new political party from within the ranks of the Ulster 
Defence Association, not the first time that a paramilitary organisation has 
taken the political path, but on this occasion the UDA seems determined that it 
should be more than an overnight phenomenon. The key question is how far the 
military activities of the organisation limit the possibilities of a transition to a 
bonafide political organisation and to what extent a defensive organisation can 
hope to seize a positive political initiative. The main section of this article 
focuses on the evolving response of both the military arm and the political voice 
of the UDA. 
The Loyalist Paramilitaries 
If a major achievement of the Unionist leadership after the partition of 
Ireland in 1921 was to coopt and thereby control popular Protestant violence in 
the service of the nascent state (through the B and C Special Constabularies), 
what has been characteristic of the present Ulster troubles has been a loss ofthat 
control along with a loss of the Stormont system. The fall of Stormont created a 
whole new dimension of militant Protestant activity. Stormont — a convenient 
shorthand for Protestant majoritarian rule — had been theirs, a Protestant 
parliament for a Protestant people. But it had been progressively undermined 
since 1969 and the reversion to Direct Rule from Westminster in 1972 radically 
altered the nature of militant Protestantism. The deep sense of betrayal, of an 
imminent "sell-out" to the Catholic enemy within (IRA) and without (Irish 
Republic), informed a chorus of protest and demonstration. However the system 
was no longer just an expression of Protestant supremacy, nor was it so readily 
influenced. 
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In these new conditions Protestant militancy had become independent of 
established political control. Its voice had developed into a distinct and separate 
refrain and paramilitary muscle was being flexed autonomously in sectarian 
assassination. What distinguished militant Protestant activity was its negative 
and reactive character. In "military" terms tit-for-tat killings followed the level 
of IRA violence; politically "boycotts" such as the 1974 UWC strike blocked 
political initiatives by the British Government. It could prevent "solutions" 
being imposed upon them without their full-hearted consent. But it showed that 
they could not enforce their own solutions. The failure of the 1977 strike showed 
also that boycott, without effective alternatives, is subject to an embarrassing 
diminishment of returns. Its overemployment could undermine militant morale 
and, indeed, fragment that loyalist unity it is designed to foster. 
UDA — A Military Role 
"The only way we will get peace here is to terrorise the terrorists" — Andy 
Tyrie, Supreme Commander Ulster Defence Association speaking on 
BBC programme The World This Weekend, February 1, 1981. 
The UDA emerged in September 1971 as an umbrella organisation encompass-
ing a number of street vigilante groups which had formed in Protestant areas of 
Northern Ireland in response to the violence that had ensued after the introduc-
tion of internment by then Prime Minister, Brian Faulkner.' It is the largest 
paramilitary organisation in the province and the only one not proscribed by 
Schedule 2 of the Emergency Provisions Act (1978). This has enabled it to 
parade openly and has facilitated the development of a political wing the 
NUPRG which will be discussed more fully later. 
There has been a positive correlation between the level of membership in the 
UDA, the amount of support it is accorded in the community and periods when 
the constitutional status quo and safety of the Protestant population have been 
perceived as under threat.2 A good instance of this was the boom recruiting 
period after the prorogation of the Stormont parliament in March 1972. 
Geographically its main strength has been in the urban areas of Belfast and 
Londonderry. Although much of the violence in the province has been concen-
trated in the border regions of Fermanagh and Armagh the UDA is weak here 
with many of the Protestant farming community opting to serve in the official 
forces of the state: the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) and the Ulster 
Defence Regiment (UDR). 
The use of terror has always been a key element in UDA strategy be it either 
to impress upon Westminster the holocaust which would follow British with-
drawal or as a retaliatory weapon against the IRA. On occasions throughout the 
province the UDA has become embroiled in internecine warfare with the Ulster 
Volunteer Force which had lain dormant since the halcyon days of 1912 until it 
re-emerged in a clandestine form in 1966, opposing the liberal measures being 
introduced by Terence O'Neill as Prime Minister. In the main these battles have 
been concerned with territory and racketeering rather than ideology. Both 
organisations have relied to a large extent for funding on robberies, collections 
in public houses, extortion and contributions from external sympathisers — 
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mainly Scotland and Canada.' 
The UDA military strategy has evolved through a series of distinct phases. In 
1972/73 it was responsible for a number of bombings and tit-for-tat sectarian 
assassinations. This involved a "clearing of the decks", the removal of the 
remaining minority residents from an area;4 and "holding the line", the use of 
force to stop physical encroachment by the Catholic population into areas 
which were viewed by Protestants as their own domain.5 In the Ulster Workers 
Council Strike of May 1974 the UDA played a prominent role.6 Members were 
prominent at street barricades and acting as enforcers of the strike call. An 
umbrella grouping, the Ulster Army Council, co-ordinated the activities of the 
"alphabet soup" of paramilitary organisations. The group warned on the eve of 
the strike: 
"If Westminster is not prepared to restore democracy, i.e.,the will of the 
people made clear in an election, then the only way it can be restored is by 
a coup d'etat".7 
This was the first instance in recent times where independence was aired as an 
alternative to the British connection, a "shadow cabinet" having been estab-
lished by the Ulster Workers Council. However there had been no considera-
tion of the future development of the economy or of the role of the minority. 
Rather it was an impulsive reaction to the crisis. It would have been a declara-
tion of independence Rhodesia-style. One thing was crystal clear however — 
when the chips were down the paramilitaries assumed the mantle of arbiters of 
Ulster's destiny. The actions of the UDA in 1974 were conclusive evidence for 
the assertion of D. W. Miller: 
"They learned public order derived in reality not from the sovereign 
authority but from their own exertions on the ground".8 
From 1974/79 the UDA appeared only intermittently in a military capacity. 
The Organisation became more and more an everyday part of the Protestant 
community in some areas. Effort was focussed on collecting revenue for the 
families of the loyalist prisoners. When Andy Tyrie became an institutionalised 
leader, so a concerted effort could be made to establish a cohesive political 
programme. Loyalist violence has essentially been reactive. As the British 
Government shied away from any political initiatives and Ulster seemed safe as 
the IRA campaign lulled, the UDA and others found it hard to justify an overt 
military role or the protection rackets which were being operated. The security 
forces were increasingly penetrating the ranks of the loyalist paramilitaries 
which were organised on a traditional pyramid structure and this, allied to an 
increased use of the confidential telephone by civilians, resulted in the severe 
weakening of many active service units. A further factor contributing to the 
comparatively dormant role of the UDA was the desire amongst a vast majority 
of the population for a cessation to hostilities partly due to war weariness and 
partly due to the activities of the Peace People. 
The most recent phase of loyalist paramilitary activity began in late 1979 
after the assassination of Earl Mountbatten and the death of 18 soldiers in 
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August of that year. The launching of a new political initiative by the British 
Government partly in response to international pressure,9 culminated in a White 
Paper published on November 22, and an escalation in IRA demands for a 
British withdrawal and resolution of the H-Block impasse. In an atmosphere of 
political uncertainty the loyalist paramilitaries thrived and the assassinations 
resumed. The new ingredient was their selectivity and sophistication. Very few 
of the National H-Blocks Committee have escaped unscathed. The role of the 
UDA in this period is a controversial one. Commentators such as David 
McKitterick in the Irish Times and Vincent Browne in the magazine Magill 
have argued that it is a carefully orchestrated campaign directed and controlled 
by the UDA godfathers.10 However attention to court proceedings indicates that 
those charged with involvement in the recent wave of killings have mainly been 
members of the outlawed Ulster Volunteer Force and Red Hand Commandos. 
A more plausible explanation is that we are witnessing independent actions by 
maverick elements who feel that the military role should be given greater 
emphasis. This is nothing new. The UDA has a long history of internal feuding 
usually resolved by violence rather than the subtlety of debate. There have been 
disagreements over whether their political programme should have a socialist 
element," links with political parties, on the desirability of collecting protection 
money from shop-keepers, on talks with the IRA and on the issue of political 
status for prisoners. Confusion reigned in the Protestant community when 
UDA members started on a hunger strike demanding the same concessions as 
the 7 IRA men who had initiated the hunger strike. Street support was minimal 
for the UDA, the inner council seemed divided, and the leadership did not seem 
to accurately reflect rank and file opinion.12 
The spate of media articles alleging a major role for the UDA in recent assas-
sinations has, however, fuelled the cacophony of voices calling for the proscrip-
tion of the organisation. Secretary of State, Humphrey Atkins, makes frequent 
statements on the government attitude in the face of a concerted attempt by the 
Alliance Party and others to provoke him into banning the groups' activities. He 
recently replied to those critics who have argued it is the sheer scale of UDA and 
pressure of space at the prisons that enables it to operate as the only legal para-
military organisation: 
"The size of an organisation has nothing to do with whether it is pro-
scribed or not. The test of proscription is whether an organisation is 
actively supporting, encouraging or engaged in terrorist activities"." 
Central to the debate has been the alleged connection between the UDA and the 
Ulster Freedom Fighters, a group organised on a cellular structure which 
appeared in June 1973. The UFF is proscribed under the Emergency Provisions 
Act (1978) yet no-one has been charged in the courts with membership of the 
organisation. Some recent murder trials relate to crimes committed in 1973 and 
claimed then by the UFF, yet the men standing trial are acknowledged members 
of the UDA.14 The title UFF has thus been viewed as a "nom de guerre" or flag of 
convenience for the UDA. The most accurate assessment is that the UFF 
emerged as a militant faction growing within the ranks of the UDA with its 
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origins in the opposition to the rampant pocket-lining and extortion which was 
allegedly taking place in the East Belfast UDA circa 1973. 
"By taking on the form and title of a new and distinct group it was hoped 
that the UDA would not be blamed for the assassinations".15 
It is ironic that the calls for the proscription of the UDA should come at a 
time when the NUPRG was ready to field candidates in the local council 
elections in May 1981. Humphrey Atkins is in the difficult position of knowing 
the UDA have committed acts of terrorism but also desperatly wanting to keep 
open the political door to the UDA. Proscription would be the end of the road 
for the political initiative and possibly provoke an internal revolt against the 
Tyrie/Barr faction. It has been because of Tyrie's position as unquestioned 
leader since 1974 that the independence option has been able to develop into a 
philosophy identified with the UDA and agreed as a political policy by the 
8-man inner council. Would the UDA honour its original motto, Cedenta Arma 
Togae — law before violence? 
NUPRG — Paramilitary in Politics 
The central problem besetting Protestant paramilitaries is to transform 
military muscle into a responsible political voice, to make the difficult transition 
from being avowed defenders of the Protestant community to being articulate 
advocates of a constructive set of public policies. Certainly past experience has 
provided little hope that the step will be a sure one. As the Supreme Comman-
der of the UDA, Andy Tyrie, confessed in a recent interview: 
"People do not trust paramilitaries, that's for sure".16 
Yet there has been a definite attempt to capture that trust, or at least, to reduce 
the mistrust of paramilitary intentions. The expression of a concern for political 
change, for a new constitutional politics, represents an attempt to shift the 
influence of Protestant militancy from the streets to the conference room. This 
political strategy has been developed by the New Ulster Political Research 
Group (NUPRG) the most prominent member of which Glenn Barr.17 Referring 
to the activities of the NUPRG, Tyrie was of the opinion that these could help to 
overcome public distrust of the paramilitaries and indeed this was the very 
reason that it "has been promoting community politics" (our emphasis). As 
Tyrie continued, 
"It should be possible for a paramilitary organisation to cross over and 
become a political one", 
and he rather dubiously cited the Democratic Unionist Party as an example of 
this.18 The assumption of Tyrie and of the NUPRG was that a distinctive politi-
cal approach can "legitimize" militant Protestant voices within the Loyalist 
community while at the same time providing an appeal that would allay the 
fears of Catholics. This is plainly quite a task. What then are the elements of the 
NUPRG's distinctive strategy? 
The NUPRG posed a middle way between irreconcilable opposites, between 
the union with Great Britain and a united 32 county Republic of Ireland. The 
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political goal is an independent Ulster and it has been sincerely canvassed as the 
only solution to the existing constitutional conflict which, so the analysis goes, 
finds expression in perpetual sectarian conflict. Within an independent Ulster 
Protestant identity could be maintained without the creation of a sectarian state 
apparatus. It puts forward an Ulster state the common allegiance to which tran-
scends Protestant "Britishness" and Catholic "Irishness"; it claims a common 
experience through common adversity, a fellow-feeling forged (however para-
doxically) through years of communal strife. Its basic assumption is that 
commonly acceptable institutions can be created on an Ulster-basis alone. So 
there would be a classical constitutional trade off. Protestants would sever the 
United Kingdom link while Catholics would forgo their allegiance to a United 
Ireland. Both would lose something, certainly — but this would be merely the 
outworn symbolism of religious and political myopia. In the new independent 
Ulster difference would now contribute to political stability and social harmony, 
not destroy them. 
These ideas were presented in an attractive version in March 1979 in a 
"discussion paper" by the NUPRG entitled "Beyond the Religious Divide". 
Flirtation with the idea of independence was nothing new in Protestant politics. 
What was different about "Beyond the Religious Divide" was that it tried to 
make it a priority not a last resort. What was proposed was a draft constitution 
and political structures for a post-independence state plus a Bill of Rights to 
guarantee and to secure the liberties of every citizen regardless of religion. In 
this paper we do not intend to consider in detail the technicalities of these 
proposals nor the economic arguments for or against but to appreciate the thrust 
of these ideas and their limitations. Let us follow through the reasoning of the 
document. 
The basic premise is that "proper politics" cannot be achieved "as long as 
there is a question of constitutional allegiances".19 It is important to note at this 
point the working class, quasi-socialist nature of the NUPRG's concept of 
"proper politics". It is a politics based on the distribution of economic resources 
and on social welfare which, so the authors contend, have been neglected while 
"sectarian politicians continue to fan the flames of religious bigotry for self-gain 
and preservation". However, what is lacking is any analysis of class relations or 
any radical critique of the politico-economic structure of the 6 counties. What is 
presented is the familiar anti-establishment, anti-politician populism which has 
been a feature of Ulster Protestantism just as much as Unionism has been. Tyrie 
has called this leaning towards socialism, whatever that may mean in practice. 
Significantly as well the traditional Protestant rallying cry of "We are the 
people!" (in effect the Catholics are not part of the state) has been supplanted 
by the phrase "our people"; in effect a full embrace of the Catholic community 
in a "United Northern Ireland". So the old zero-sum game of constitutional 
politics has given way to a solution which: 
"does not have a victor and a loser. It will encourage the development of a 
common identity between the two communities, regardless of religion. It 
offers first class Ulster citizenship to all our people, because like it or not, 
the Protestant of Northern Ireland is looked upon as a second class British 
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citizen in Britain and the Roman Catholic of Northern Ireland as a 
second class Irish citizen in Southern Ireland".20 
For the NUPRG the struggle to remain British, to preserve the Union, has 
been consistently spurned by Westminster. The purpose of loyalty must be 
re-examined and loyalty must now be focussed solely on Northern Ireland. 
Catholics are enjoined to consider their alienness from the Republic which, so it 
is argued, wants Northern Catholics just as little as Great Britain wants 
Northern Irish Protestants. Hence the attempts, ingeniously, to rediscover and 
trace an "Ulster" identity extant before the plantations of the 17th Century, in 
other words to assert a belonging that is not British as traditionally understood 
by Loyalists, but separate. It seeks two things. First, it seeks to establish a 
Protestant, Scots-Irish right to the province of Ulster. Second, it seeks to 
express a common heritage that transcends the history of Planter and Gael and 
to emphasise past untainted by religious bigotry. The most notable effort to date 
is the book The Cruthin by Ian Adamson.21 It also explains why Protestant 
paramilitary leaders (or some at least) have taken an interest in that formerly 
most taboo subject, Celtic Mythology. 
However attractive this initiative may be for UDA commanders, serious 
loyalist objections may be cited. First, independence asserts above all the 
"Irishness" of the present troubles (even if it is a provincial Irishness) and 
denounces Protestant "Britishness". Yet this sacrifice is immeasurably greater 
on the part of the Protestant community than is the withdrawal of claims of 
sovereignty on the part of the Irish Republic to the territory of Ulster. It is a 
self-sacrifice, and if Britain goes, it goes for good. But the Irish border remains 
and thus the Irish dimension remains too, providing still a powerful magnetic 
attraction for nationalist aspiration within Ulster. Indeed, Irish nationalists 
have for long made it clear that the only factor preventing the achievement of 
Irish unity has been the presence of the third party — Great Britain. Second, 
there can be no guarantee that the IRA will disappear. As the NUPRG docu-
ment stresses, independence must be a long-term solution. But the IRA see 
British withdrawal as a stepping stone to the 32 county Republic. It pursues the 
ideal and will brook no half-way houses. Why should a border between Irishmen 
remain after withdrawal? What should make an independent Ulster any more 
acceptable than an Ulster as an integral part of the UK? There could never be 
any security of possession for the independent Ulsterman. As Conor Cruise 
O'Brien has persuasively argued "Ulster Protestants do fear Catholicism", and 
that deeply ingrained historical fear would most likely be heightened, not eradi-
cated, in an independent Ulster.22 Third, and probably crucially, no definite 
Ulster nationalism exists and certainly not one that would act as a cement to 
bind the religious communities together. The compliance of the Catholic com-
munity — obviously still a minority after independence, whatever the 
constitutional guarantees — is still problematical. For what is central to 
Catholic fears is not so much the British link per se but Protestant majoritarian 
rule. 
The final point raises another crucial dimension to the argument for a negoti-
ated independence. What we have been examining is the benign face of paramili-
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tary politics. We stress that we do not doubt the continued sincerity of many of 
those who put forward the proposal. Yet to use O'Brien's classification of 
scenarios, there is also a malignant face that may look to a completely different 
prospect for independence.23 In this regard the rationale of independence would 
be for the Protestant majority to have a clear field to "clear out" Republican, 
Catholic areas and so defeat militarily, the IRA. Protestant violence would 
shift from the reactive, the sporadic and the random to the calculated, the offen-
sive and the sustained. In other words independence would facilitate a calculated 
pogrom. The result would be a final solution and a Protestant Ulster homeland 
maintained. For instance in a recent article in Ulster, the publication of the 
UDA, entitled "Why Independence is Feared by the IRA", the author boldly 
writes: 
"It is no secret that if Ulster were to 'go it alone', the IRA would have 
their backs to the wall. The situation would also be similar if Britain with-
drew and declared a United Ireland against the wishes of the electorate".24 
The author does envisage a final solution but although he makes the distinction 
between "the Catholic population" and the IRA he gives no satisfactory indica-
tion of how, in practice, this could be done; nor, how "the hiding places, the rat-
holes, the sewers from which they (the IRA) emanate" could be destroyed 
without an open assault upon the whole Catholic population. Independence as 
retribution is the voice of angry Protestant despair in the tones of aggressive 
self-confidence. And the suspicion which Tyrie recognizes the public has for the 
paramilitary UDA is rooted in this potential alternative. There can never really 
be any adequate guarantee that behind the sweet words of reason there is no 
thought of destruction. 
Which Way Forward? 
The position of the UDA with regard to the established political parties has 
been a fluctuating one. The original rules stated that anyone who stood for 
public office could not be a member. Loyalist politicians however have courted 
their favour on occasions. Examples of this were the serried ranks of UDA men 
in evidence when William Craig addressed the massive Vanguard rally at 
Belfast's Ormeau Park in March 1972. Craig with his phrase "we must 
liquidate the enemy" concisely enunciated the view which has permeated loyalist 
paramilitary thinking throughout the present troubles. A second example was 
the Paisley/UDA alliance in the abortive 1977 strike. It was these two Unionist 
politicians who attracted most support from the paramilitaries but as the crisis 
developed so the UDA developed its own activist military philosophy, beyond 
the pale of parliamentary procedures. This was the line of argument — the army 
was continuing its "kid gloves" policy towards the IRA and there was no local 
control over the situation with both the Stormont parliament and the B-Specials 
gone. Someone therefore had to deal with a deteriorating law and order situa-
tion. The UDA assumed the role of judge and executioner imposing harsh penal-
ties on dissident elements within their own community, assassinating suspected 
Republicans and on occasions confronting the army. It has been this overt 
element of violence in the UDA programme which has müde a link-up between 
the paramilitaries and the political parties hard to achieve. A second factor has 
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been the growing resentment amongst the paramilitaries of "armchair generals" 
who raise the level of tension in the community with speeches denouncing the 
IRA and the government and then rush to disown the Loyalist prisoners in the 
Maze prison.25 
The spirit of Ulster nationalism which Glenn Barr and the UDA hope to 
kindle has as its sinequanon the view of the Ulster Protestants as a chosen 
people. The great difficulty the Barr faction have is of convincing Ulster 
Catholics that they will be welcome in the promised land. The interplay and 
contradiction between the political and military role is well illustrated by the 
recent comment of John McMichaels, a leading spokesman for theNUPRG. In 
the series written by Robert Kee Ireland — A Television History McMichaels 
argued that a political solution could only be reached when the Protestants 
stopped looking to London for support and the Catholics forsook their aspira-
tion of a united Ireland; both concentrating on making Ulster a viable state. 
However, in a BBC Spotlight programme at the height of the hunger strike 
crisis he said: 
"If there gives a complete breakdown of law and order the Loyalist 
paramilitaries would have to go in and take out the leadership of the IRA 
. . . That means eliminate them." 
The local government elections in May were a test for the UDA's proposed 
political role, especially since the weeks prior to these were characterized by a 
severe increase in sectarian tension. This was due to the impasse between the 
Republican hunger strikers and the Conservative government on the issue of 
political status and to the election of Bobby Sands as MP for Fermanagh and 
South Tyrone. His death on hunger strike polarised political activity. So within 
the UDA an obvious problem arose for the "political faction. Although Ulster 
independence was their central policy any open advocacy of it at this stage 
would have been politically dangerous.26 Unionist opinion was not in the mood 
for constitutional tampering. The NUPRG decided to contest the elections on 
"bread and butter issues". 
The fact that only two candidates unequivocally stood on the NUPRG ticket 
shows the pressure on the political factions strategy.27 It was only after a major 
meeting of leading UDA members from the entire province that the NUPRG 
was given the go-ahead albeit on a limited basis. However, their standing at all is 
proof of the skilful tactics of Tyrie and Barr. Their approach had two main 
elements. First, that the security forces should deal with Republican violence. 
Only if this failed would the UDA become militarily active. Essentially the 
UDA stood back from the confrontation over the H-Blocks which as the leader-
ship had hoped was largely confined to West Belfast. Secondly it was agreed 
that the political imitative should be equally low key. No mention was made of 
UDA support for political status. (No risks were taken to alienate hardcore 
loyalist support.) Both candidates were senior officials. In Belfast Area E the 
NUPRG candidate polled 1,135 first preference votes in a poll of 17,547. In the 
same area a candidate recognised as the political spokesman for the Ulster 
Volunteer Force polled 1,931. Their combined first preference vote was 17.47%. 
The NUPRG candidate lay fourth out of six on first preferences but failed to get 
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elected on transfers. In Area G the candidate polled 14.25% on the first count 
and was elected on the second. On the basis of this admittedly limited entrance 
to the political arena the result for the paramilitaries was more successful than 
any previous performance.28 
Since May the UDA has decided to launch a new political party, the Ulster 
Loyalist Democratic Party to replace the NUPRG. The announcement came at 
an opportune moment and helped to divert attention away from two distinctly 
unfavourable pieces of publicity. The first was the intimated links between the 
UDA and the National Front (categorically denied by the former) and the 
second the discovery of arms and ammunition at the Association's headquarters 
in Belfast. While the former might merely prejudice the UDA's avowed "social-
ist leanings" the latter might have entailed the organisation's proscription. The 
agitation for a ban we have already mentioned. McMichael denied that the idea 
of the party had been spawned by the threat of proscription. Nonetheless its 
announcement came at a most felicitous time. The press statement issued on the 
same day claimed that the ULDP represented an "urgent need for deeper 
political involvement with the community".29 Independence is to remain the 
long-term goal but the short and medium term tactics are to concentrate on 
issues such as housing and employment. The problem with this, as the Workers' 
Party found to their cost in May, is that no one votes for any party without con-
sidering its stand on the constitution. It still remains doubtful if traditional 
Unionists or Republicans will be attracted by the independence option. 
While many Protestants may look in a time of crisis for protection by the 
UDA there is a mental block against voting for a group many of whose 
members are in prison. Catholics fear that the birth of the independent state 
may involve a pogrom against them. These are the difficulties for the ULDP in 
politics.30 Many people in Ulster want to believe that the child will not have the 
characteristics of the father, but they have serious doubts. 
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